Footnote
- Such changes in yields are not arbitraged away because of the strong preference of investors for bonds of certain maturity.听
April 4, 2025
This edition of Global Navigator explores the recent upward shift in global interest rates. Initially, the rise stemmed from hikes in central bank policy rates aimed at squelching the post-pandemic spike in inflation. Long-term rates also moved higher, by more than would be expected, based on the rise in short-term rates alone. Ballooning government debt, rising inflation expectations and greater uncertainty stemming from heightened geopolitical risk and changes in the global trading order, are behind those increases.
Higher borrowing costs dampen business investment, household spending and the extent to which governments can respond to adverse economic conditions. They are reducing global growth and increasing the risk of a financial market meltdown.听听
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Global interest rates have been on an uneven rise since 2021, reversing decades of decline (Chart 1). For example, the yield on the US 10-year Treasury note averaged 2.3% from 2013 through 2019. It fell sharply during the Covid pandemic but then began to rebound in 2022. Over the past 18 months it has averaged 4.3% (about where it is today) and briefly touched 4.8% in January of this year.听
Similar patterns are seen across advanced and developing economies. This is despite efforts by central banks to cut rates. The exception is China, which is flirting with deflationary pressures.听
The historically low long-term rates experienced in the decade following the Great Financial Crisis (GFC)鈥攁 product of the post-GFC economic malaise, zero interest rate policy and quantitative easing from central banks鈥攁re unlikely to return barring a financial catastrophe.听
The move up in long-term rates is rooted in three shifts; 1) estimates of the neutral or non-inflationary short-term interest rate have moved up, especially in the US, which dominates global financial markets; 2) inflation expectations are rising at home and abroad, fueled by escalating trade tensions; and 3) term premia are back, in part due to rising fears of sovereign defaults and increased upside risks to inflation.
Chart 1: Global interest rates have recently climbed after decades of decline
10-year government bond yield, percent
The underlying level of real, or inflation-adjusted, short-term interest rates consistent with the economy operating at full employment鈥攖he so-called neutral rate鈥攈as edged higher. This can be seen most dramatically in what are known as the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) by the Federal Reserve. The long-term expected fed funds rate, which is a proxy for the Fed鈥檚 estimate of neutral, jumped by one-half percentage point between late 2019 and its most recent projections in March 2025.听
A host of factors contributed to that increase. The largest single factor was the remarkable resilience that the US economy showed in the wake of the pandemic. A surge in investment and productivity growth helped. The Fed was not alone among central banks in moving estimates of the non-inflationary or neutral rate higher.听
Recently, inflation expectations in the US have risen as illustrated by consumer and financial market measures in Chart 2: Consumers' expectations have soared, both one year and five years out, with most citing concerns about the implications of tariffs. The Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) spread, which is the nominal 5-year Treasury yield minus the corresponding TIPS rate, shows a 50-basis point increase in inflation expectations since September 2024 and an increase of roughly 25-30 basis points compared to the average for all of 2024.听
The Blue Chip Survey of professional forecasters is equally worrisome. It now anticipates inflation in 2025 to be about one-third of a percentage point higher than it projected in November 2024.听
We have seen similar concerns abroad, with the central banks of some of our closest allies and trading partners warning about the risks of stagflation given the push to retaliate against US-initiated tariffs.听
Chart 2: Inflation expectations are climbing
Evident in market-based and survey measures, percent
Estimating term premia, which is the extra compensation the bond holder receives for bearing the risk involved in holding the long-term instrument versus a series of shorter-term instruments, is not a precise endeavor. Chart 3 shows estimates of the 10-year term premium from two alternative models created by Federal Reserve economists, the D鈥橝mico, Kim and Wei () and Adrian, Crump and Moench () models, and the average of the two. There has been a sharp rise since last Fall, which explains a significant portion of the increase in bond yields in recent months.听
Higher term premia could be related to a perceived lack of fiscal discipline, which is occurring across both developed and developing economies. Another element of the term premium is related to the relative supply and demand of bonds of various maturities.
Quantitative tightening by the Fed works by increasing the supply of longer-term Treasury notes in the market, which causes their price to fall and yield to rise.1听 An expectation that the Treasury would increase the issuance of longer-dated Treasury notes would have a similar effect and add to term premia. That is one of many proposals the administration is weighing.2听
Chart 3: Term premium estimates
10-year Treasury note yield, percentage points
Business fixed investment, consumer demand for big-ticket purchases (vehicles, appliances, etc.) and demand for housing are all among the most interest-rate sensitive sectors. Add a surge in economic policy uncertainty and some sectors of the global economy are seeing a paralysis set in.听听
Capital spending is typically financed with debt, so the net return on a given investment falls as interest rates rise. This can result in some projects being shelved or scaled back. The more rates rise, the more projects that get scaled back or skipped altogether, weakening overall business fixed investment.
Housing demand is very interest sensitive. Most home purchases are financed with a mortgage. Given the size of a typical mortgage, even relatively small changes in mortgage rates can add hundreds of dollars to a monthly mortgage payment. This can lead to homebuyers being priced out of the market, lowering their bid or scaling back their aspirations. The reduced demand for housing will result in less new construction and weaken home prices.
Consumer durables purchases are often financed on credit, especially light vehicles. If higher auto loan rates are here to stay, consumers may hold on to their existing vehicles longer, choose less expensive models, or switch to used vehicles. That weaker demand for new vehicles restrains auto production and hinders GDP growth.鈥�
Higher interest rates raise government debt servicing costs, which leave governments less room to counter recessions. They may up the need for austerity measures down the road, which could deepen the depth of a downturn when it does occur.
The higher interest rate path we now expect for 2025 and heading into 2026 is a major factor that led us to mark down our projection for GDP growth in the US in 2025 and beyond compared to just few months ago.鈥�
Higher rates put pressure on government debt servicing, raise the risk of default and therefore associated risk premia, and accentuate the risk of contagion.听 Rising risk premia and the corresponding decline in the value of sovereign debt adversely impact the balance sheets of investors and banks increasingly loaded with that debt. Global sovereign debt continues to climb absolutely and as a share of global GDP (Chart 4). Debt stress in economies with large amounts of outstanding debt can result in rising volatility, higher risk premiums, increased financing costs and eventually spill into emerging markets (EMs). Global inequality worsens as EMs are forced to take on exorbitant interest rates or are locked out of the market all together.听
The default risks are not limited to sovereign debt. The spreads between investment grade bonds and lower rated bonds have widened in response to concerns about the pressure tariffs could exert on earnings. This is occurring at the same time that non-bank lending has soared and become increasingly opaque. The rating agencies are beginning to raise red flags about the size of that debt, the underwriting standards and whether it can weather the firestorm of tariffs. No one knows how significant the contagion risks are, only that they exist and, if realized, could ripple through the global economy much like the subprime debt crisis of 2008-09.听
Chart 4: Government debt has increased by 400% since 2000
Debt (LHS): $ Trillions - Debt to GDP Ratio (RHS): Percent
The historically low long-term rates experienced in the decade leading up to the pandemic and its immediate aftermath are a thing of the past.
The historically low long-term rates experienced in the 2010s and the pandemic鈥檚 immediate aftermath are a thing of the past. Elevated rates are working to slow economic growth, constrain fiscal policy and add to financial fragility.听
The implementation of tariffs will increase inflation in the near term and possibly beyond. This exacerbates the risk of higher for longer interest rates, which, in turn, ups the risk of a sovereign or private default. In the short run, lower rates are unlikely, absent a severe global contraction. 听
Global economic growth is forecast to slow to 2.9% in 2025 and 2.8% in 2026, down from 3.2% in 2024. This is projected to be the slowest growth since the pandemic. Emerging trade wars are expected to simultaneously stoke inflation and slow growth. Uncertainty will likely dampen investment. We anticipate the US will impose significant tariffs on key trading partners who are expected to retaliate in kind.听
Central bank policies are beginning to diverge. We now forecast no further rate cuts by the Fed in 2025. Cooling inflation prompted the Bank of England and European Central Bank to cut rates early in the year, while the Bank of Canada has cut several times to stimulate its economy.
Growth in Europe is forecast to continue to post tepid growth numbers, with growth expected to ebb from 1.5% in 2024 to 1.3% in 2025 and 1.1% in 2026. The new push to increase defense spending provides some upside risk to our baseline scenario but raises the likelihood of higher inflation.听
Growth in the Middle East and Africa region is predicted to accelerate from growth of 2.5% in 2024 to 3.6% in 2025 and 3.9% in 2026. Since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has removed some production curbs, the expectation of expanded supply has already driven down oil prices.听
Growth in North America is expected to slow from 2.5% in 2024 to 1.5% in 2025 and 1.3% in 2026. Tariff uncertainty amongst the US, Canada and Mexico will slow growth in the region as we approach the 2026 renegotiation of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).听
Growth in South America is forecast to see growth edge lower from 2% in 2024 to 1.9% in 2025 and 2026. Brazil鈥檚 growth is expected to slow significantly. The threat of tariffs on copper may weigh on Chile and Peru, the world鈥檚 top producers.听
Global Outlook Forecast - April 2025
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The global government debt balloon, defaults are not impossible.
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