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Despite current trade tensions, there are reasons to believe that responses from both the U.S. and Vietnam will lead to constructive outcomes rather than further deterioration. Key points include:

Vietnam is unlikely to retaliate against U.S. tariffs, as doing so would harm broader economic and diplomatic interests. Instead, it may adopt a "go slow" approach if necessary, avoiding escalation. Experts suggest that Vietnam should prioritize negotiation and goodwill measures, such as reducing import tariffs on American goods, to balance bilateral trade and avoid further conflict[2][3].

The bigger risk lies in secondary effects such as U.S. inflation and economic performance, which could reduce consumer spending power and demand for "Made in Vietnam" goods. Lessons from the 2009 recession show that while U.S. exports increased during downturns, Vietnam’s shift up the value chain (e.g., more electronics like phones rather than low-value goods like chinos) has introduced higher demand elasticity. Inventory front-loading could distort export orders in 2025 but would reflect temporary disruptions rather than long-term trends[1][3].

Higher U.S. interest rates, potential dollar sell-offs, and yen appreciation are creating volatility that impacts Vietnam’s growth prospects. High Federal Reserve rates increase financing costs, lower asset values, and constrain growth (Morgan Stanley predicts no Fed rate cuts in FY25). However, fiscal stimulus across Asia is expected to boost regional consumer demand, while a stronger yen could reinvigorate Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI), mergers & acquisitions (M&A), and capital markets activity in Vietnam—highlighting Japan’s enduring confidence in Vietnam's economy[1][2].

General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng’s legacy of "Bamboo Diplomacy" ensures Vietnam remains "friends with all" while leveraging relationships with key partners such as the EU, UK, Japan, ASEAN, and China through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). These nations will likely sympathize with Vietnam’s challenges under high U.S. tariffs, especially as globalization shifts towards "friendshoring" for security reasons—minus significant U.S. involvement[1][3][5].

Table 3. Vietnam Free Trade Agreements

• Existing Offers: Previous proposals involving tariff reductions, purchases of planes, Starlink satellite internet services, and Trump Towers remain on the table[2][3]. 
• Fiscal Firepower: Vietnam has substantial capacity for additional purchases of U.S. goods (e.g., gas, infrastructure projects, military equipment)[2]. 
• Policy Flexibility: The USTR report on Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) highlights areas where Vietnam could make concessions—such as easing restrictions on used medical equipment imports, toys, pharmaceuticals, genetically engineered corn/soybeans, data protection rules, investment barriers, and tax reforms (e.g., Digital Services Tax). Many of these adjustments are feasible within Vietnam’s policy framework and could benefit other countries under WTO/MFN rules[2][3].

While challenges persist due to high tariffs and secondary impacts on demand and financial markets, both the U.S. and Vietnam have strong incentives to find mutually beneficial solutions. Vietnam’s strategic diplomacy, economic resilience, and negotiation flexibility position it well to mitigate risks while fostering deeper trade ties with global partners[1][2][3].

The long-term consequences of "Amerixit" on the global economy are easier to predict, as historical precedents provide valuable insights. Key impacts include:

• Economic Growth and Prosperity: The era of globalization has driven global economic growth and prosperity, lifting billions out of poverty and increasing global GDP. With Amerixit, this trend will likely reverse, though the extent remains uncertain. However, ex-U.S. trading blocs such as the EU, ASEAN, and RCEP are expected to remain strong or even strengthen, partially offsetting the decline[1][3][4]. 
• Inequality Dynamics: Globalization reduced inequality globally by alleviating poverty but increased local inequality as jobs shifted. Amerixit may reverse this paradigm—reducing inequality within the U.S. but making it a poorer country overall. While Trump's objectives of reshoring jobs might be achieved domestically, this would come at significant economic cost[2][3][4].

Protectionism is unlikely to deliver its intended results. Americans born today will not be working in low-value manufacturing jobs (e.g., sock factories) by 2040. Instead, they will need to adapt to advanced technologies like AI—just like workers in other nations[2][5].

Historically, tariffs have been unpopular among voters and have led to significant political consequences. Examples include the McKinley Tariffs of 1890 (causing a 50% loss in GOP seats) and the Smoot-Hawley Tariffs of the 1930s (leading to decades-long Democratic dominance). Amerixit could trigger a similar backlash against protectionism, potentially swinging U.S. politics away from Trumpism toward more open trade policies[3][5].

Trump’s approach has divorced trade from security considerations, disrupting convergence trends like “friendshoring.�� This is evident in punitive tariffs imposed on key allies such as Japan (24%), Korea (25%), Taiwan (32%), and the EU (20%)—essential partners for U.S. security[1][3].

Expect new or expanded geopolitically driven trade blocs focused on security rather than free-market globalization. While "friendshoring" is gaining momentum globally, the U.S.'s diminished role in these arrangements could weaken its geopolitical influence[3][5].

Amerixit represents a significant shift away from globalization with predictable consequences for the global economy and U.S. domestic politics. While ex-U.S. trading blocs may mitigate some negative impacts globally, the U.S.'s long-term competitiveness and prosperity are at risk due to protectionist policies that stifle innovation and efficiency. Geopolitical dynamics will increasingly favor nations with strong alliances and integrated trade strategies—leaving America isolated unless its policies pivot toward collaboration and openness[1][3][4].